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The ALSEP Data Subsystem has been evaluated by an independent contractor to 
provide added confidence that no allowable sequence of commands can prevent proper 
operation of the ALSEP System. This report assesses' the significance of the failure 
modes disclosed in this study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A subcontract study was assigned to VEDA Incorporated to" ... to analyze the current 
design of the ALSEP Data Subsystem to determine if design errors exist which would 
. prevent proper operation of the ALSEP due to a peculiar or unplanned series of 
perations. In particular, the concern is whether or not logic trains exist in the 
wgic design which can allow the ALSEP to enter an irrecoverable state. 11 (Ref. l }. 
Results of this study are documented in Reference 2. In general, it has been con-
cluded that " ... under normal conditions the Data Subsystem has no irrecoverable 
states. There are, however, several abnormal situations which could result in 
a premature loss of ground control over the ALSEP". (Ref. 2). 
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The sections which follow contain statements of these abnormal situations as 
presented in Section 6 of Reference 2 and joint engineering/reliability assessments 
on the significance of these failure modes along with conclusions. ~ "2~oc..-"'\'lt-I...-
Situation (a}. Failure Modes - Action of timer inhibit command n~':ould prevent 
the circuit breaker reset action from occuring should the command receiver trip 
its circuit breaker. 
-:>iscussion. During normal operation, the receiver circuit breaker is automatically 
energized to the power-on condition by readily available 12 hour timer output pulses. 
This feature has been incorporated primarily to attempt to restore receiver power 
in the event a receiver malfunction should cause an extreme receiver overload condition. 
Even though the restoration of power assumes that the receiver malfunction is self-
correcting this feature was incorporated because of the critical n.;1"e<5~~U;,.eceiver. 
As pointed out in Section 4. 3 of Reference 2, command no~ovides the capability 
to ignore the timer one minute and 12 hour output pulses. \...flr(s -shut-off capability 
is intended to be used only for the protection the ALSEP experiment users in the 
event of erratic timer operation. ·~ "'} ~~ ~ 
Consequently, even though the conditions of sitlJ. ion (a) is recognized, it pre-
supposes the occurance of two serial malfunc · ing events: (I} timer malfunction 
which necessitated the execution of comman and (2) a self-correcting receiver 
malfunction which caused an extreme overload condition. The probability of this 
~ccuring is remote. ~ ~~~\...,..-
It is recommended however that the use of command no~e flagged as a critical 
command in the Operations Manual and that its use be limited only to circumvent 
an erratic timer operation. 
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Situation {b). Manual Switching of PCU. - Command 48 and~ect either section 
of the PCU to be used. Directing the second section l::ie used by command 50 could 
disable ALSEP if the second PCU section were unknowingly inoperative. 
Discussion. The philosophy behind the PCU design was to eliminate single points 
of failure. The automatic switch-over circuit will cause power conditioner {PC) 1 
to turn off and PC2 to turn-on in the event of an over-or-under voltage condition. 
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The automatic switch-over circuit will not switch back to PCl in the event of an over-
or-under voltage. This is to prevent oscillation between PCl and PC2 in the event 
of any one of six failures in the switch over circuit. 
There is no way to determine if PC2 is operational while PCl is operating or vice 
versa. The non-operating PC is a redundant circuit which is inactive when the other 
PC is operating. Therefore it is very important that commands 48 and 50 be used 
only if the operating PC gives indications of impending failure and/or the automatic 
switch over circuit does not switch when an over-or-under voltage.condition exists. 
The latter condition could only occur if the regulator in PCl and the switch over 
circuit failed. 
Situation {c). Failure of Address Memory Flip-Flop. - Both sections of the command 
decoder would be inoperable if the address memory flip-flop failed in either section. 
Discussion. This situation has been thoroughly investigated. As documented in 
Reference 3, "Several alternate designs were evaluated to determine their effective-
ness for eliminating this failure mode. It was concluded the reliability improvement 
that could be realized was negligible and did not justify the cost, weight, and schedule 
impact." " 
Situation {d). Abnormal Generation of Switching Pulse. - Under an unusual combina-
tion of logic gate operations a switching pulse could be generated in the loss of 
threshold reset circuit. This could result in a premature reset occurring preventing 
either command execution or command verification from occurring. 
Discussion. The circuit considered in situation (d) is schematically shown below 
for discussion purposes. 
a----------------------------------------~ 
b-----------------------------------~ 
C-----------e-------------------------------~ 
+-----'c 
d -------------1 
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The point in question is the switching time delay between points c and c. where c is 
the inverted output of c. As per Fairchild LPDTp.L 9042 data sheet, the delay time 
between the input and output signals are typically 60 nanoseconds and are 150 nano-
seconds maximum for devices sinking and supplying current to 10 other logic devices. 
For one unit load application. as described above, the average delay time is greater 
than the maximum specified for 10 unit loads. 
The situation described is therefore not a potential problem area because 150 nano-
seconds delay is more than sufficient to guarantee proper operation. 
Situation (e). Inhibit of Reset.- A decoder programmer failure occurring between 
counts 43 and 63 prevents normal reset. As a result the alternate decoder section 
is continually locked-out of use. 
Discussion. As stated in Section 5. 4 of Reference 2. this type of failure is peculiar 
primarily to the first six stages of the programmer counter and is a function of the 
operational state of the command decoder. That is. the following exact sequence 
must occur before this failure mode could occur. 
1. The programmer counter must be operational at the time a proper 
address is detected. 
2. The counter must function normally between counts 29 and 43, 
3. First six stages of counter and/ or associated drive logic must malfunction prior 
to count 63 (20 msec interval). 
A cursory analysis by ALSEP reliability pertaining to the conditional probabilities 
stated above indicate the probability of the failure mode occurring is extremely 
remote. In addition the criticality of the failure mode with respect to loss of uplink 
command capability (as defined by reference 3) is negligible. 
Failure of count 63 gate in the high state will not produce the referenced failure 
mode unless the counter is also inoperative. 
Situati<m (f). L<Dss of Threshold. - Should a loss of threshoid occur during a command 
execution. the command will continue to be executed until the threshold is restored. 
This could be detrimental to user logic or create an abnormal power demand. 
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Discussion. The situation described cannot occur and was reported because of an 
error in the command decoder logic diagrams (233297 3, shts 2 and 5). This potential 
problem was discovered during the development of the command decoder brassboard 
model and has been corrected on all subsequent models. Unfortunately the logic 
diagram error was not discovered until after the VEDA review. Refer to CRD 51097 
for change description. ' 
Situation (g). Uncertainty of Enable Flip-Flop State. - The data processor shift 
pulses enable flip-flop (in the command decoder) can start-up in either state. Be-
cause this flip-flop can only be reset by the data processor, certain data processor 
malfunctions can disrupt the operation of the command decoder. 
Discussion. Discussions pertinent to the data processor interface failure modes, 
presented in Section 5. 4 of Reference 2, are summarized in Table 1. 
Failure modes 1 through 5 represent conditions which allow the command decoder 
to successfully process and execute commands. The command verification capability 
is either disabled or operable depending upon the type of failure. (See Table 1 ). 
BxA concurs with VEDA relative to failure mode #6 which results in the loss of 
uplink command capability*. 
This would occur as a result of either of the following failures. 
1. Open circuit in DP/CD interface harness. 
2. Failure of CVW flip-flop or output inverter in either data processo::r;. 
"\ 
This failure mode will be included in the forthcoming update of the FMEC;\ document 
(Reference 3). The probability of occurrance will be combined witJ"l~'~toe-~ented 
failure modes causing the same system effect (e. g., loss of command receiver, 
demodulator, diplexer filter). However, its criticality is anticipated to have a 
negligible effect. 
In the event a harness failure occurred, the failure effect, as stated, would be 
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correct. However, if this failure occurs in the data processor, • an, operational pro-
cedure can be implemented which will circumvent the loss of uplink command capability. 
Should the data demand signal fail high while the command decoder is in the search 
"''mode or actively processing a command, the capability of executing one or two additional 
commands exists. This capability will permit commanding of the DP to be switched 
to the redundant side, thus clearing the problem. 
* NOTE: This failure will not cause system abort. 
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In order to effectively implement this procedure, monitoring of the command 
verification word (CVW} would be required prior to processing an uplink command. 
Under normal operation the CVW will be either: 
Present after the execution of a command. 
2. All 11 0" in the event the command was executed but Data Demand 
did not occur. 
3. All ''0'' when the CD is in the search mode. 
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In the malfunctioned state, random data will be pr~2ent in the CVW, regardless of j 
the operational states of the CD. Therefore, by~mplementing an operational procedure . 
to switch DP1 s when the CVW is either incorr-?ct or not all 11 0 11 s, the loss of uplink 
command capability can be circumvented. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Bendix assessment on failure modes associated with mission commands for 
the Data Subsystem indicates no requirement for design changes however certain 
)recautions should be exercised prior to using certain commands and an operational 
procedure is required to recover control in event of malfunctions in the data 
processor. Therefore, the following actions are recommended. 
l. Inform Apollo Operations (MCC-H) of the criticality of commands no. 27, 
48, and 50. 
2. Prepare an operational procedure for recovering from data processor 
malfunctions. 
3. Compare the probability of loss of command capability resulting from conductor 
malfunction in the harness, CVW flip-flop failure or output inverter failure 
with other non-redundant parts in the up-link and document this in the next 
issue of the FMECA. 
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TABLE 1. Data ProceF · Interface Failure Mode Summar-
--interface Failure Mode 
Data Gate 
(DGl ZP} 
Data Demand 
{DDl ZP) 
Effect on Command Decoder 
CD will be capable of processing commands via either redun-
dant section but command verification will be lost. Assuming 
failure in DP - command verification can be restored by 
commanding DP to redundant side. Assuming failure in 
DP/CD harness - command verification capability is lost. 
Same effect as 1. 
CD section in operation at time of failure can process and 
execute subsequent commands between data demand times, 
but with loss of command verification. Redundant CD section 
can pro~ess and execute subsequent commands with the loss 
of command verification. Assuming failure in DP - command 
verification can be restored by commanding DP to redun-
dant side. 
Same effect as 1, however, partial loss of command 
I verification words. 
Fails LOW 
during a data 1 
demand time l 
Fails HI 
anytime 
Same effect as 1. 
Disables both sections of the command decoder. 
(See discussion). 
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